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RECENT CASE NOTES
case intimates. 20 The remainder of the jurisdictions adhere to the old rule
but many do so only reluctantly.2 1
To devise a better method of discharge, the best remedy is simply to hold
the social interest today is such that consideration is not needed for the
promise to discharge the debtor.2 2 Since the doctrine requiring consideration
for a discharge 'has become so deeply imbedded in the common law, it appears
the legislatures will have to bear the burden of making the change. The
courts that have reached the desired result have done so only by couching the
reasoning in a manner that it still seems to be following the logical concept
of consideration. The judges have not had the courage to come directly forward
and state that consideration is not needed for a discharge. Apart from
fraying the edges of the logical concept of consideration, there appears that no
ill result will come from holding a written promise to discharge to be
sufficient. Perhaps ultimately consideration as a requisite for any bargain
contract will be superseded by the requirement of writing, but at present
this reform in the case of discharges seems a sufficient step.
Minnesota, like Indiana, having enacted a statute declaring the seal to no
longer have its common law effect,2 3 and holding to the old doctrine requiring
some consideration other than payment of a lesser sum, one may well observe
that an effective method of discharge is needed. By its opinion the Minnesota
court has shown its readiness to revolt. It is submitted that the appropriate
move is for these states to adopt one of the statutes making a written discharge
effective without consideration. L. N.M.
DIVORCE-JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTERr-REs JUDIcATA.-Plaintiff hus-
band, after obtaining in the District of Columbia a divorce a mensa e1 thoro
from his wife on the ground of cruelty, made a claim that he had established
his domicil in Virginia and there sought an absolute divorce for desertion,
grounds not recognized by the District of Columbia. The defendant wife
made an asserted special appearance only for the purpose of establishing the
plaintiff's lack of domicil as required by Virginia law for divorce. The
Virginia court found that the husband had acquired a domicil within the
state and entered a decree of absolute divorce. There was no appeal taken
from the decree holding that the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter
and of the parties. The plaintiff then sought recognition of the absolute
divorce in the District court; this was refused on the ground that the Virginia
court did not have jurisdiction of the parties or of the marriage status.
Held on appeal, reversed. The Virginia court's determination of its own
jurisdiction over the subject matter is res judicata and entitled to full faith
and credit in all other jurisdictions in this country. Davis v. Davis (1938),
59 S. Ct. 3.
21 The courts which criticize the doctrine most consistently are found in
Colo., Minn., Kans., Texas and U. S. 1 C. J. S. p. 541.
22 For a discussion of the abolition of the requirement of consideration in
contracts generally see note in 23 Va. L. Rev. 446 (1936); Wright, Ought
the Doctrine of Consideration to be Abolished from the Common Law?, 49
H. L. R. 1225 (1936); 3 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 312 (1935); 21 Ill. L. Rev. 185
(1926) ; 1 Ill. Law Bull. 65, 174 (1917).
23 Burns Ind. St. Ann. (1933), § 2-1601. Mason's Minn. Gen. St. (1927)
§ 6933.
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Two factors complicate the uniform recognition of foreign divorce decrees-
divergent views as to what constitutes jurisdiction for divorce and differences
of opinion as to the nature of divorce proceedings.1 Generally domicil of
one spouse in the state will confer jurisdiction over the marriage status if
there is either a voluntary appearance and submission to jurisdiction, or the
absent spouse has consented or by misconduct ceased to have a right to object
to the acquisition of a separate domicil, or the state is the last matrimonial
domicil.2 In the famous Haddock case3 the United States Supreme Court
avoided settlement of the divorce recognition problem by refusing to extend
in all cases full faith and credit to foreign divorce decrees obtained against
non-resident defendants. As distinguished from the principal case, there was
in the Haddock case no appearance by the defendant but only a default
judgment.
On the theory of waiver of jurisdiction over the person the conflict above
cited has been eliminated where the non-resident party has put in a general
appearance and had his day in court.4 As a matter of academic theory,
jurisdiction over subject matter cannot be waived or created by consent but
it is properly recognized that the cases reach an incongruous result.5 The
American Law Institute by caveat explicitly refused in the Restatement of
Conflict of Laws, to express an opinion as to whether a party appearing may
attack subsequent to judgment the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter.6
This controversial question has now apparently been settled. It was pre-
viously held that every court in rendering a judgment tacitly, if not expressly,
asserts its jurisdiction over both the parties and the subject matter,7 and
where the jurisdiction is explicitly contested and decided there can be no
subsequent collateral attack. The principal case unequivocally establishes as
res judicata the adjudication of jurisdiction over the marriage status where
the non-resident defendant appears to challenge the domicil of the plaintiff.
In a still later case the United States Supreme Court has held as res judicata
in state courts th6 determination of jurisdiction by a federal bankruptcy court
to decree cancellation of a guaranty in reorganization proceedings. 8
In reaching its decision the Court has acted in accordance with substantial
precedent and sound logic. Jurisdiction may be waived9 or estoppel may
1 Jones, "Conflict of Laws in Divorce Cases", 10 Notre Dame Lawyer 11.
2 Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 113.
3 Haddock v. Haddock (1906), 201 U. S. 562, 26 S. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867.
4 Jones v. Andrews (1870), 77 U. S. 327, 19 L. Ed. 935. Note: Waiver
applies only in the case of general appearance, not in case of special appearance
for the express purpose of challenging jurisdiction unless the right to special
appearance has been taken away by statute. Western Life Indemnity Co. of
Illinois v. Rupp (1914), 235 U. S. 261, 35 S. Ct. 37, 59 L. Ed. 220.
5 Gavit, "Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter and Res Judicata", 80 U. of
Pa. L. R. 386.
6 Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 451.
7 Chicago Life Insurance Co. v. Cherry (1916), 244 U. S. 25, 37 S. Ct. 492,
61 L. Ed. 966.
8 Stoll v. Gottlieb (1938), 59 S. Ct. 134.
9 German Bank v. American Fire Insurance Co. (1891), 83 Iowa 491, 50
N. W. 53, 32 Am. St. Rep. 316; also see Harper, "The Validity of Void
Divorces", 79 U. of Pa. L. R. 158.
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prevent an assertion of lack of jurisdiction,1 0 the theory being that jurisdiction
over the subject matter is not created by the conduct of the litigants but that
attack on the decree of jurisdiction is precluded by such conduct. Though
generally held that the jurisdiction of a court rendering judgment is always
open to inquiry in another state on a collateral question,1 1 yet many state
courts ,have recognized the adjudication of jurisdiction by sister states as res
judicata.12 The federal Supreme Court in the instant case has adopted this
view. Appearance to contest the issue of domicil results in a conclusive finding
as to domicil. By plea and by conduct taken together the non-resident spouse
submitted to the Virginia court's jurisdiction for all purposes, despite the
assertion of only special appearance. With jurisdiction over the person and
a finding of domicil, the Virginia court properly assumed jurisdiction over
the subject matter, which assumption must be recognized as binding on all
courts. Full faith and credit must be accorded to a judgment by a court
of competent jurisdiction. The question of competency may be determined by
the court involved. 1 3
The result of the principal case is undeniably desirable. Since the question
of jurisdiction is judicial, certainly there can be no objection to the court
exercising the power to determine its own jurisdiction especially since the
controversy must be ended at some point. No reason presents itself why a
party who has enjoyed due process should be permitted to retry t4e issue of
jurisdiction previously determined; rather a finding of the fact of jurisdiction
shoula possess the quality of finality. There is no reason to suppose that a
second decision will be more satisfactory than the first. Even though the
Virginia court may have erred in its assumption of jurisdiction its determina-
tion is conclusive and may not be questioned by either party collaterally or
otherwise than on writ of error or appeal from the original adjudication.
Having litigated the question in one competent tribunal and been defeated,
the same question may not be litigated in another tribunal acting independently
and without appellate jurisdiction. J. W. C.
EVmENCE: INFERENCE UPON AN INFERENE.-Plaintiff, the beneficiary of a
policy issued by appellee upon the life of one Leo J. Orey, brought suit to
recover double indemnity for the death of the insured. Recovery was condi-
tioned upon showing that "death had come as a direct result of bodily injury
effected solely through external, violent, and accidental means . . evi-
denced by a visible contusion or wound on the exterior of the body."
Deceased was a truck driver and was last seen driving his truck through
a small village. Later he was seen on the ground in the rear of the truck.
looking under it. After a short time, weaving and vomiting, he staggered
into the village store and collapsed. He was suffering from a severe rupture
lOBruguiere v. Bruguiere (1916), 172 Cal. 199, 155 Pac. 988; also see
Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 112; I Freeman, judgments (5th ed. 1925),
Sec. 320.
11 Old Wayne Mutual Life Assoc. of Indianapolis v. McDonough (1907),
204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236, 51 L. Ed. 345, I Black, Judgments, Sec. 289.
12 Northwestern Casualty & Surety Co. v. Conaway (1930), 210 Iowa 126,
230 N. W. 548. Degge v. Baxter (1917), 69 Colo. 122, 169 Pac. 580. Contra:
Marshall v, Owen & Co. (1912), 171 Mich. 232, 137 N. W. 204.
13 1 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1925), Sec. 350.
